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Abstract 
 
Mises’ ‘calculation argument’ against socialism argues that monetary calculation is 
indispensable as a commensurable unit for evaluating factors of production. This is 
not due to his conception of rationality being purely ‘algorithmic,’ for it 
accommodates non-monetary, incommensurable values. Commensurability is needed, 
rather, as an aid in the face of economic complexity. The socialist Neurath’s response 
to Mises’ is unsatisfactory in rejecting the need to explore possible non-market 
techniques for achieving a certain degree of commensurability. Yet Neurath’s 
contribution is valuable in emphasising the need for a balanced, comparative approach 
to the question of market versus non-market that puts the commensurability question 
in context. These central issues raised by adversaries in the early socialist calculation 
debate have continued relevance for the contemporary discussion. 
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1. Introduction  
 
This paper aims to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of two adversaries in what has 
since become known as the ‘socialist calculation debate’. Ludwig von Mises and Otto 
Neurath held opposing views on the feasibility of establishing a democratic, non-
market economy. A balanced evaluation of their respective contributions is of more 
than just historical interest. It is shown here to have important implications for 
assessing the more recent course of the debate and establishing the objectives of 
future research.  
 
The Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises’ 1920 paper, ‘Economic Calculation in 
the Socialist Commonwealth,’ in which he rejects the possibility of rational economic 
planning in socialism, sparked a debate that continues to this day (Kirzner 2001, 171). 
i Mises’ critique of socialism was primarily aimed at the Austrian socialist Otto 
Neurath and his proposals for a ‘socialised’ economy (O’Neill 1998, 113). By the 
1930s, the debate had extended to English speaking journals and books (Vaughn 
1980, 535) with socialists such as Henry Dickinson, Oskar Lange and Maurice Dobb 
all responding to Mises’ ‘socialist calculation argument.’ Meanwhile, F.A. Hayek 
followed on from Mises in further developing the case against socialism. Mises’ work 
remains influential, with a number of recent contributions having emphasised its 
centrality to the case for the indispensability of markets (Kirzner 2001, 194).ii  
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Neurath’s account of socialism was, like Mises’ critique, of great significance as an 
early contribution to the debate. The detailed proposals for a socialist economy 
offered by Neurath represented a departure from the approach of traditional Marxists 
such as Kautsky, who considered such a speculative approach to be ‘utopian’ 
(Cartwright et al 1996, 22). As has been highlighted by O’Neill, an important feature 
of Neurath’s work is his emphasis upon the incommensurability of values. Neurath 
contends that monetary calculation is inadequate as a means for rational choice and 
proposes a broader conception of rationality that incorporates decision-making in 
terms of multiple criteria (O’Neill 1998, 116-118; O’Neill 2003, 187-193; Uebel & 
Cohen 2004, 11). A further sense in which Neurath is of significance, discussed later 
in this paper, is his recognition of the implications of this incommensurability thesis 
for how we should assess both the socialist calculation debate and more generally the 
case against markets.  
 
In this paper, Mises’ calculation argument is firstly introduced and analysed. The role 
of commensurability and the conception of ‘practical rationality’ in his thesis are 
discussed, with reference to O’Neill’s reading of Mises as offering an ‘algorithmic 
view of practical rationality.’ A different interpretation of Mises is offered here and is 
supported by subsequent discussion of his use of the concepts of rationality, 
subjective value, and utility. On this reading, Mises’ position in the calculation debate 
is shown to be consistent with that of Hayek. The adequacy of Neurath’s response to 
the calculation argument of Mises and Hayek is then assessed. The philosophical 
position shown here to be evident in the work of Mises, as well as Neurath and 
Hayek, is also shown to prompt some further questions that demand a broader 
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approach to the debate about market and non-market systems. Finally, implications of 
this assessment for the present and future of the calculation debate are highlighted.  
 
2. Mises’ economic calculation argument 
 
Mises’ calculation argument is founded upon three advantages that he cites of 
conducting economic calculation in terms of market exchange values (Mises 1935, 
97-8). The first of these is that it facilitates interpersonal valuation; the second 
concerns the necessity of factor markets and the third points to the role of money as a 
commensurable unit of measurement. These are each discussed below. The latter two 
points require extended discussion, reflecting the detailed treatment that Mises gives 
to them. 
 
The first advantage of market exchange values is that they enable the individual 
valuations of all participants in the market system to be incorporated into the process 
of economic calculation. As Mises puts it, “exchange value… arises out of the 
interplay of the subjective valuations of all who take part in exchange” (Mises 1935, 
97). This first argument is discussed only briefly by Mises and is closely connected to 
the two further advantages of market calculation assessed below. 
 
3. The need for factor markets  
 
The second argument for market calculation specifically relates to the need for market 
exchange of factors of production. Factors of production are of three kinds: natural 
resources, human labour and “higher goods.” The latter category means manufactured 
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goods that are used during the production process rather than for final consumption.iii 
Mises holds that factor markets cannot exist in socialism, a society in which “all the 
means of production are the property of the community” (Mises 1935, 89). His 
argument is therefore not intended to apply to forms of guild or market socialism that 
incorporate factor markets. Given that in socialism, by definition, there is no market 
exchange of factors, “it will be impossible to determine (their) monetary value” (ibid, 
92). Here, Mises is implicitly assuming the point which he later states: “Exchange 
relations between production-goods can only be established on the basis of private 
ownership of the means of production.” (ibid, 112). This thesis is further bolstered by 
Mises’ subsequent emphasis upon the importance of incentive-driven 
entrepreneurship in a market system as part of the process of establishing exchange 
value of factors (ibid, 116). 
 
In socialism, the system for allocating factors of production is logically distinct from 
the system of distribution that allocates consumption, or ‘final goods’: 
 
“It is characteristic of socialism that the distribution of consumption-goods must be 
independent of the question of production and of its economic conditions” (ibid, 90). 
 
Mises allows that money could be used in socialism for the distribution of ‘final’ 
goods (ibid, 92). He seems to consider it likely, if not inevitable, that, even if 
socialism started out with a rationing system, monetary exchange of final goods 
would emerge. However, “the means of distribution of consumption goods” is, for 
him, of “more or less secondary importance” (ibid, 90). This form of monetary 
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exchange would only ever be operating within “narrow limits” (ibid, 91) in socialism, 
given the collective ownership of the means of production.  
 
For Mises, it is the allocation of factors of production that is the key problem for 
socialism (Mises 1935, 104; Vaughn 1980, 539) and is generally referred to by 
contemporary commentators as the ‘economic calculation’ problem (see, for example, 
Armentano 1969, 129; Lavoie 1985, 51-4, Boettke 1990, 13). The problem of 
economic calculation thus relates to what shall be referred to here as ‘productive 
calculation,’ meaning decisions facing producers about what to produce and which 
factors to use. 
 
Mises makes clear that this calculation problem arises from economic complexity. 
Producers must choose from a wide range of possible scales, methods and objectives 
of production.iv That the need for factor markets is seen by Mises to originate from 
the complexity of production choices is clear when he notes that factor markets are 
not necessary in a simple economy. He allows that factor markets are not necessary 
for the “farmer in economic isolation” who must choose between the expansion of 
pasture farming and hunting (Mises 1935, 96). But for Mises, it is “obvious “ that 
“this is only possible in very simple conditions” (ibid, 97). Such choices require the 
producer to reduce “all elements in the computation” to the alternative possible sets of 
final consumption goods that he could then “evaluate immediately” in deciding which 
to produce (Mises 1936, 115). There are two different aspects of this problem of 
economic calculation that are highlighted by Mises. First is the complex, “diverse” 
range of modern productive processes (Mises 1935, 96). Monetary calculation is 
essential, he comments, because it “affords us a guide through the oppressive 
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plenitude of economic potentialities” (ibid, 101). Monetary valuation is a means of 
comparing these productive methods. Secondly, Mises makes the important point that 
the economic calculation offered by the market embodies more than just technical 
information about the productivity of different factors: 
 
“technical calculation is not enough to realise the ‘degree of general and teleological 
expediency’ of an event; it can only grade individual events according to their 
significance; but… it can never guide us in those judgements which are demanded by 
the economic complex as a whole” (ibid, 129). 
 
Economic rationality thus involves ensuring that the value of higher goods relates to 
the subjective valuations that consumers attribute to the final goods they might be 
used to produce. The opportunity cost of using a higher good for a particular 
productive purpose is tied to the consumer valuations of the range of final goods that 
might be produced. As Mises puts it, monetary calculation “enables us to extend 
judgements of value which apply directly only to consumption goods – or at best to 
production goods of the lowest order – to all goods of higher orders” (Mises 1936, 
117). Economists refer to this feature of factor prices incorporating consumer 
preference as ‘factor imputation.’ Lavoie further explains it: 
 
“In a complex, multistage production structure, these evaluations of higher order 
goods are ‘derived’ or ‘imputed’ from the producer evaluations at the next lower stage 
of producer goods and ultimately from the consumers’ demands for the lowest order 
of goods. Were anything to sever this connection of value imputation between lower 
and higher stages of production, a potential ‘calculation problem’… could emerge” 
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(Lavoie 1985, 51). 
 
Lavoie explains that, for Mises, there is an extra degree of complexity involved in 
calculating how to employ higher order goods, compared to the allocation of final 
goods. 
 
“Consumer evaluations may be inaccurate in the sense that consumption goods may 
fail to meet expectations, but producer evaluations that combine complex 
technological questions with value questions are far more susceptible to error, and the 
error that results is more likely to have serious social consequences” (Lavoie 1985, 
51). 
 
Due to this complexity of economic calculation, attempts to consciously plan a system 
of factor prices according to these principles will inevitably fail: 
 
“The mind of one man alone… is too weak to grasp the importance of any single one 
among the countlessly many goods of a higher order. No single man can ever master 
all the possibilities of production, innumerable as they are, as to be in a position to 
make straightway evident judgements of value without the aid of some system of 
computation” (Mises 1935, 102). 
 
In a static economy, Mises allows, it is “conceptually possible” (ibid, 109) to conduct 
economic calculation but the problem of complexity is of course compounded once it 
is recognised that “in real life… our economic data are for ever changing” (ibid, 
109).v As a result of this inevitability of economic change the “socialist economic 
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order” is left “floundering in the ocean of possible and conceivable economic 
combinations without the compass of economic calculation” (ibid, 110). 
 
4. Did Mises hold an ‘algorithmic conception of practical rationality’? 
 
The third advantage of monetary calculation offered by Mises is that monetary units 
enable the costs of each decision to be expressed in terms of a single, common 
denominator. Such monetary costs, or ‘exchange values,’ are the price for which 
goods exchange on the market. As Mises puts it, “calculation by exchange value 
makes it possible to refer values back to a unit” (Mises 1935, 98). The necessity of a 
commensurable unit of measurement arises from the need for incorporating 
interpersonal comparisons, as well as the complex range of higher and final goods. 
The three advantages of monetary calculation offered by Mises are thus closely 
interconnected. 
 
The reason why Mises considers a commensurable unit of measurement to be 
necessary shall now be discussed further, with reference to the interpretation offered 
by John O’Neill. O’Neill’s interpretation appears in his commentaries on the 
calculation debate (O’Neill 1995, 1996 and 1998) and in his review of Neurath’s 
discussion of non-market associations (O’Neill 2003). On O’Neill’s reading, Mises’ 
thesis on the need for a commensurable unit originates from his “algorithmic” 
conception of practical reason. This interpretation is encapsulated in the following 
two passages from O’Neill:vi 
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“Mises had rejected the possibility of socialism on the grounds that rational choices 
between alternatives were impossible in the absence of a single monetary measure 
through which comparisons could be made. Mises assumes an algorithmic conception 
of practical reason. Rational decision making requires a single common unit which 
reduces the choice between different options to a matter of calculation, of the 
application of mechanical procedures of calculation to arrive at a determinate answer 
to a question” (O’Neill 2003, 188). 
 
“Comparability between options requires monetary prices that measure exchange 
value such that one is able to have a determinate answer to the advantages of 
alternatives by way of simple rules” (O’Neill 2003, 188). 
 
In assessing O’Neill’s interpretation it is helpful to introduce a distinction between 
two kinds of conception of practical rationality and to consider which kind of theory 
Mises is offering. The first is an instrumentalist conception of practical rationality that 
is concerned solely with establishing procedures as means for achieving given ends. A 
second kind of theory is of a practical rationality that incorporates ethical judgement 
and hence evaluates the ends of activity , rather than just the means.  
  
Turning firstly to practical rationality in the instrumental sense, Mises certainly does 
propose that monetary calculation is a necessary tool for making practical choices 
between different means for achieving desired ends. This point is made in the 
following quote by Mises that is cited by O’Neill: 
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“The practical man… must know whether what he wants to achieve will be an 
improvement when compared with the present state of affairs and with the advantages 
to be expected from the execution of other technically realisable projects which 
cannot be put into execution if the project he has in mind absorbs the available means. 
Such comparisons can only be made by the use of money prices” (Mises 1949, 209). 
 
Given the essentially algorithmic nature of monetary calculation, this would seem to 
support O’Neill’s interpretation. Indeed, Mises does refer to reason as being 
concerned solely with the means for achieving certain ends, such as in the following 
comment in Human Action: 
 
“All instinctive impulses defy examination by reason because reason deals only with 
the means of attaining ends sought and not with ultimate ends” (Mises 1949, 173). 
 
As O’Neill notes, Mises states in Epistemological Problems of Economics: “the 
ultimate goals—the values or ends—at which action aims are beyond rationality” 
(Mises 1960, 148). Here, Mises is stating his subjectivist position, which holds that 
there can be no rational justification for the particular moral ends that we hold 
(O’Neill 1998, 43). Mises illustrates this point by using the following example: “It is 
neither more nor less rational to aim at riches like Croesus than to aim at poverty like 
a Buddhist monk” (Mises 1949, 880). 
 
In addition to Mises’ instrumentalism, O’Neill’s reading can draw further support 
from Mises’ remarks on the irrationality of socialist production when the instrument 
of monetary calculation is absent:  
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“for the most part, it would no longer be possible to speak of rational production. In 
the absence of criteria of rationality, production could not be consciously economical” 
(Mises 1936, 119).  
 
Mises later states: “economic activity is rational activity” (ibid, 124) and rational 
production becomes “completely impossible” when “one gives up a freely established 
monetary price” (Mises 1935, 104). Mises even questions whether “rationality and 
logic in thought itself” would be possible without the economic calculation that is 
facilitated by the market (ibid, 105). 
 
Thus Mises certainly does ascribe an instrumental role to monetary calculation that is 
in this sense an algorithmic tool for rational decision-making. But is this a complete 
account of Mises’ conception of rationality? Mises also offers a conception of non-
algorithmic, non-instrumentalist ethical judgement. It is to be argued here that this 
cannot be excluded from an account of Mises’ conception of practical rationality or of 
the thrust of his calculation argument against socialism.  
 
While there is clearly evidence that, for Mises, monetary calculation is necessary for 
rational economic calculation, it does not follow that he considers calculation in terms 
of monetary exchange values to always be sufficient for rational choice between 
productive alternatives. Although O’Neill does not explicitly address the point, his 
discussion implies that for Mises, calculation in terms of monetary exchange values is 
always sufficient for rational choice to occur. This is evident in the two passages from 
O’Neill quoted above, which refer to a “determinate answer” to choices being reached 
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by means of an algorithmic, mechanical process of comparing monetary prices. It is 
again evident when he suggests that, for Mises, there is an “algorithm… for arriving 
at an optimal decision” (O’Neill 2003, 191). Mises, on this reading, allows no room 
for non-monetary criteria to be considered in productive decisions. It is to be argued 
here that Mises’ account of such decisions does incorporate non-algorithmic, non-
monetary values and therefore that it is misleading to refer to his conception of 
practical rationality as algorithmic.  
 
O’Neill offers the following passage from Socialism in support of his reading of 
Mises: 
 
“If, for example, we are considering whether a hydraulic power-works would be 
profitable we cannot include in the computation the damage which will be done to the 
beauty of the waterfalls unless the fall in values due to a fall in tourist traffic is taken 
into account. Yet we must certainly take such considerations into account when 
deciding whether the undertaking shall be carried out” (Mises 1936, 116, cited in 
O’Neill 1998, 117). 
 
However, rather than supporting the O’Neill interpretation, this passage offers 
evidence against it. By “such considerations,” Mises is referring to the “elements of 
value which are not the subject of exchange,” that, he says, “elude” the computations 
based on exchange value (Mises 1936, 116). The value of the natural beauty of the 
waterfall is one such consideration. Contrary to the O’Neill interpretation, Mises is 
arguing that this non-economic good “must certainly” (ibid, 116) be taken into 
account when deciding whether to build the power works.  
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As O’Neill acknowledges (O’Neill 1998, 117), Mises considers the beauty of the 
waterfall to be a ‘non-economic’ good. Mises gives further examples of such non-
economic goods, including the “beauty of a place or of a building, the health of the 
race, the honour of individuals or nations” (Mises 1936, 116). O’Neill interprets 
Mises as arguing that such non-economic goods both can and must be evaluated 
solely in monetary terms. According to O’Neill, Mises argues that when “hard 
choices” need to be made, as in the waterfall case, we must assign monetary values to 
non-economic goods, thus becoming “implicit accountants, putting a price on 
unpriced goods” (O’Neill 1998, 117). It is true that Mises does consider it necessary 
to establish the monetary cost of different alternatives. It is also true that decisions 
such as in the waterfall case, do themselves influence prices. But monetary criteria are 
not sufficient for reaching a rational decision. Mises explicitly states that non-
economic goods “cannot enter into money calculations” (Mises 1936, 116).  
 
O’Neill uses the following passage from Mises as evidence for his interpretation: 
 
“If we know precisely how much we have to pay for beauty, health, honour, pride, 
and the like, nothing need hinder us from giving them due consideration. Sensitive 
people may be pained to have to choose between the ideal and the material. But that is 
not the fault of a money economy. It is in the nature of things” (Mises 1936, 116). 
 
Here, Mises does not mean that the value of non-economic goods can be expressed 
monetarily. Knowing how much we have to pay for an economic good rather means 
knowing the difference between the monetary price of the policy that preserves it and 
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the policy that does not. To illustrate this point, the cost of preserving the non-
economic value of the waterfall is as follows: let C = the cost of building the 
hydraulic power works and maintaining it over a certain period of time. Let B = the 
revenue from the energy generated during that time. Let ER = the tourist revenue that 
would be gained if the power works was not built during that time. The monetary 
opportunity cost of preserving the beauty of the waterfall by not building the power 
works (OC) can be expressed as:  
 
OC = (B – C) – ER  
 
OC does not, for Mises, fully express the value of preserving the waterfall because it 
does not and cannot take into account the value of the ‘non-economic goods’ that it 
provides, such as its natural beauty. Mises’ position can be expressed in terms of the 
formulation of total economic value (TEV) used by contemporary environmental 
economists (Pearce et al 1989): 
 
TEV = AUV + OV + EV 
 
where 
 
AUV = actual use value 
OV = option value 
EV = existence value 
 
In this formulation, option value is distinguished from actual use value in that it refers 
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to the value of potential use. Existence value is the intrinsic value of environmental 
goods, as distinct from their actual or potential use (ibid, 60-61). The tourist revenue 
(ER) above constitutes the AUV of the waterfall.vii However, ER does not capture the 
OV and EV of the waterfall and it is this part of TEV that, Mises allows, cannot be 
captured by monetary cost. 
 
In relation to his waterfall example, Mises holds that, when only monetary criteria are 
considered, the opportunity cost of preserving the waterfall (OC, as defined above) is 
a positive value. However, Mises is not claiming that TEV=OC. His claim is rather 
that knowing OC is a necessary part of making a rational choice about the future of 
the waterfall. This rational choice involves comparing OC to the ‘non-economic’ 
components of the value of the waterfall (expressed in the above formulation as 
OV+EV).viii This is clear in Human Action where Mises considers the development of 
a water supply project that would result in the demolition of a historical landmark: 
 
“The fact that the feelings which recommend the conservation of the monument 
cannot be estimated in a sum of money does not in any way impede the councilmen’s 
decision. The values that are not reflected in any monetary exchange ratio are, on the 
contrary, by this very fact lifted into a particular position which makes the decision 
rather easier” (Mises 1949, 216).  
 
It is therefore clear that, for Mises, such normative decisions involve weighing non-
monetary values such as aesthetic values or ecological goods against their monetary 
cost. This is not an algorithmic process in the sense suggested by O’Neill that there is 
a determinate answer yielded by the procedure itself. It involves making a comparison 
 17
between monetary cost on the one hand and a non-economic value on the other. The 
non-economic good is, in this sense, being treated ‘in natura,’ without being assigned 
a monetary value. Hence, as Cockshott and Cottrell observe, Mises’ use of the 
waterfall example shows that “Mises, to his credit, is also quite willing to admit that 
important environmental issues cannot be brought within the ambit of monetary 
calculation either” (Cockshott and Cottrell 1993, 82-83). In this respect, Mises’ 
position is consistent with that of contemporary environmentalists who point to the 
limitations of ‘contingent valuation,’ a method for assigning monetary values to 
ecological servicesix.  
 
O’Neill’s interpretation of Mises originates from the interpretation held by Otto 
Neurath. Neurath states that, for Mises, “money calculation discloses whether 
production should be undertaken or not” (Neurath 1925a, 428).x This explains his 
surprise at Mises’ comments on the deliberate destruction of goods by monopolists 
(Mises 1936, 387-8) in which, as Neurath points out, Mises makes room for “a 
concept of wealth separate from the money calculation” (Neurath 1925a, 428). 
However, on the interpretation offered here, Mises is being quite consistent. He does, 
after all suggest that non-economic goods “are just as much motives of rational action, 
provided people think them significant, as those normally called economic,” (Mises 
1936, 116) and adds that there is “no difficulty in taking them into account”(ibid, 
116). He further remarks that monetary calculation can be misleading “when it is 
employed to estimate the value of things which are not exchangeable as, for instance, 
when people attempt to estimate the loss due to emigration or war” (ibid, 117). The 
motivational importance of such values means that, for Mises, in spite of his 
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subjectivism, there is a sense in which ethical judgements are a part of practical 
rationality: 
 
“And since complete satisfaction is impossible, the sphere of economic activity is 
coterminous with the sphere of rational action. It consists firstly in valuation of ends, 
and then in the valuation of the means leading to these ends. All economic activity 
depends, therefore, upon the existence of ends. Ends dominate economy and alone 
give it meaning” (Mises 1936, 124-5).xi 
 
In Human Action, he expresses the point as follows: 
 
“Economics, as a branch of the more general theory of human action, deals with all 
human action, i.e. with man’s purposive aiming at the attainment of ends chosen, 
whatever these ends may be. To apply the concept rational or irrational to the 
ultimate ends chosen is nonsensical” (Mises 1949, 880). 
 
When contrasted to Mises’ explicitly instrumentalist treatments of the concept of 
rationality, these passages leave a certain ambiguity about the status, rational or 
otherwise, of ethical judgements. What is however clear is that, on Mises’ account, 
the ‘economic’ activity, that is here “coterminous” with rational activity, is meant in a 
broad sense that does incorporate non-monetary values as an important motivator of 
action. Mises’ distinguishes between two senses of the term ‘economic’. Economic 
activity in the general sense consists of the “valuation of ends, and then in the 
valuation of the means leading to these ends” (Mises 1936, 124). Narrow, or ‘purely 
economic’ action involves only “exact,” “money calculation” (ibid, 124) and 
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essentially consists of numerical profit and loss calculation (Mises 1960, 158). Mises 
considers economic activity in the former, more general sense to be synonymous with 
rational activity (Mises 1936, 124-5).xii Economic in the narrow sense excludes ‘non 
economic’ objectives that are included as motives of economic activity in the general 
sense. This includes “immaterial,” or moral, as well as material ends (ibid, 125), as 
might be, the case, for example, in a decision to go to war (ibid, 126). The aesthetic 
value of the waterfall or historical monument referred to in Mises’ examples would 
also fall into this category.  
 
The concept of rationality is thus concerned with realising both monetary objectives 
and non-monetary, incommensurable values. The waterfall example shows that, for 
Mises, evaluative judgements are often required that cannot be reduced to purely 
monetary calculation or algorithmic rationality. Normative ends constitute a part of 
rational activity in the sense that they motivate rational choice. The close relationship 
between ethical judgements and the instrumental activity through which values are 
realised means that it is misleading to characterise Mises’ conception of practical 
rationality as purely ‘algorithmic.’ 
 
5. Subjective value, exchange value and utility 
 
Consistent with Mises’ view that not all values can be reduced to money prices, is his 
concept of subjective value that he distinguishes from monetary, or exchange, value. 
That subjective value is not reducible to exchange value is a point made subtly in 
Mises’ 1920 paper when he states that “Money is no yardstick of value, nor yet of 
price. Value is not indeed measured in money, nor is price. They merely consist in 
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money” (Mises 1935, 98).  
 
Mises also explains the sense in which subjective values are not measurable: 
 
“Valuation can only take place in terms of units, yet it is impossible that there should 
ever be a unit of subjective use-value for goods. Marginal utility does not posit any 
value, since it is obvious that the value of two units of a given stock is necessarily 
greater than, but less than double, the value of a single unit. Judgments of value do 
not measure; they merely establish grades and scales” (Mises 1935, 96-7). 
 
For Mises, the value of goods can only be expressed ordinally, as a preference 
ranking, rather than in terms of a cardinal unit of measurement. Mises rejects the 
possibility of cardinal measurement of subjective value in his subsequent work, 
Socialism: 
 
“There are in the sphere of values and valuations no arithmetical operations; there is 
no such thing as a calculation of values” (Mises 1949, 122). 
 
Mises expands upon this point in Human Action. He considers the value of all goods 
to consist in their utility. Yet Mises rejects the claims of previous utilitarian 
philosophers and economists such as Jevons who considered utility to be a 
phenomenon that is measurable. They “failed to recognise the purely formal character 
of the notions pain and pleasure and gave them a material and carnal meaning” 
(Mises (1949), 15). He criticises those mathematical economists who “have gone so 
far as to declare economic calculation could be established on the basis of units of 
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utility” (ibid, 353). Mises’ conception of value is utilitarian only in a “formal” sense 
of “that which acting man aims at because it is desirable in his eyes” (ibid, 21). This 
preference satisfaction theory of utility allows for the possibility of differences in the 
subjective content of different individuals’ satisfaction. 
 
Mises emphasises that the ordinal ranking of goods guides the exchange transactions 
of market participants and is, in this sense, the basis of monetary calculation. In 
relation to the waterfall, the comparison between the opportunity cost of its 
preservation and the non-economic benefits yields such an ordering. But there is 
clearly a difference between allowing for the possibility of the preference ordering of 
such non-economic goods and the claim that exact monetary values can be assigned to 
them. As shown above, Mises does not make this latter claim and makes clear that 
monetary values cannot be assigned to such goods.  
 
Mises’ concept of subjective value is not reducible to exchange value. He points out 
that it is because of this divergence in the subjective value and exchange value of a 
good that exchange occurs at all (Mises 1949, 205). Although Mises does not make 
the point in quite these terms, it would seem that, with respect to final goods, 
exchange occurs when the exchange value of a good is lower than its subjective value 
to the consumer. Economists have since referred to this extra utility, gained by 
consumers, as a ‘consumer surplus.’  
 
Rather than being a sole determinant of exchange value, subjective value is one of its 
four sources. Another two are the costs of production and the market structure. The 
fourth is the interaction between supply and demand, including speculative trading, as 
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is acknowledged by Mises’ comments in his 1920 paper on the fluctuation of 
exchange value: 
 
“The exchange-relationship which obtains between money and goods is subjected to 
constant, if (as a rule) not too violent, fluctuations originating not only from the side 
of other economic goods, but also from the side of money” (Mises 1935, 204). 
 
Such divergence between subjective value and exchange value needs to be assessed 
by economic actors in particular cases. Mises’ recognition that prices generally only 
approximate to subjective values reflects his scepticism about whether the 
neoclassical concept of equilibrium is ever attained in real economies. In contrast to 
the neoclassical school, Mises views economic decision-making as an imperfect 
process based upon subjective judgements that are often intuitive, even unconscious 
(Lavoie 1985, 64), rather than being purely algorithmic.  
 
That Mises distinguishes between subjective value and monetary price supports the 
interpretation offered here that his theory of economic calculation makes room for 
non-monetary values. In terms of advocating a theory of ordinal utility, Mises 
occupies common philosophical ground with his adversary in the calculation debate, 
Otto Neurath. Whilst Mises’ conception of utility is more formalistic than that of 
Neurathxiii, this formalism reveals that his calculation argument is not dependent upon 
any substantive notion of utility. Given that, for Mises, prices emerge from the ordinal 
ranking of options by market participants, it is notable that such rankings could in 
principle be made according to any kind of ethical criteria. The case for prices hinges 
upon their usefulness as a calculative tool rather than them being a comprehensive 
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and precise measure of value. The fundamental reason for the indispensability of 
monetary calculation lies not in the algorithmic nature of rational choice but as further 
explained below, in the complexity of economic decisions. 
 
6. Complexity as the source of the calculation problem 
 
The concept of complexity lies at the root of Mises’ argument that economic 
calculation is impossible in socialism. This can be illustrated using the waterfall 
example discussed above. Given the complex range of interconnections that 
characterise an economy, the monetary valuations of C, B and RE referred to above 
embody a multiplicity of valuations of other goods. To take C, the cost of building the 
power works, this valuation must embody the opportunity cost of the factors of 
production required, which itself depends upon the value of all alternative uses of 
these factors. A valuation such as this encapsulates a complex set of interrelationships 
across the economy that requires a commensurable unit in terms of which it can be 
expressed.  
 
Mises views our cognitive abilities as limited in relation to such complexity. This is 
implicit when he remarks that the level of complexity of economic problems that are 
soluble ‘in natura’ depends upon our intellectual ability: 
 
"How far it is possible to bring the relatively remote prerequisites of well-being into 
this rank order without resorting to more complicated processes of thought depends 
on the intelligence of the individual. It is certain, however, that even for the most 
gifted person the difficulties of weighing means and ends become insurmountable as 
 24
soon as one goes beyond the simplest processes of production involving only a short 
period of time and few intermediary steps" (Mises 1960, 156). 
 
Monetary calculation, originating from market exchange, is therefore presented by 
Mises as a necessary tool for economic calculation in a complex economy. This is 
why he refers to money prices as “aids to the mind” (Mises 1935, 102).  
 
As O’Neill acknowledges, Mises gives examples of simple decisions being made ‘in 
kind.’xiv The first of these to be discussed here relates to the decision of socialist 
planners about what to produce. The second relates to the other aspect of productive 
calculation, how best to produce it.  
 
The first example is a choice between whether to produce 1000 hectolitres of wine or 
500 of oil. Mises allows that it would be possible to make such a simple decision 
without the need for monetary calculation. 
 
“It will be evident, even in a socialist society, that 1000 hectolitres of wine are better 
than 800, and it is not difficult to decide whether it desires 1000 hectolitres of wine 
rather than 500 of oil” (ibid, 103). 
 
Mises was later to state explicitly that in socialism it would be possible to make such 
judgements concerning the consumption goods that should be produced: 
 
“It is not a question of whether there shall be produced cannons or clothes, dwelling 
houses or churches, luxuries or subsistence. In any social order, even under Socialism, 
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it can very easily be decided which kind and what number of consumption goods 
should be produced. No one has ever denied that.” (Mises 1936, 141). 
 
Ramsay-Steele, a contemporary proponent of the economic calculation argument 
against socialism, recognises the implications of Mises’ position here. He views 
Mises as having conceded too much in allowing for the possibility of ‘in natura’ 
valuation even in such simple cases. His response is as follows: 
 
“Well, I deny it. A society that cannot value factors ipso facto cannot value final 
goods – therefore a society that can value final goods can value factors, so Mises’ 
unwarranted concession about consumer goods contradicts his economic calculation 
argument. Without knowing what consumer goods cost to produce, the administration 
is in no position to select the kind and number of consumer goods” (Ramsay-Steele 
1992, 118). 
 
Ramsay-Steele is denying the possibility of evaluating alternative sets of final goods 
‘in natura,’ in a way that would incorporate both production costs and public demand. 
Mises, with his scepticism about the possibility of democracy in socialism (see Mises 
1936, 82-5), is not necessarily seeking to incorporate public demand into the imagined 
decision, at least not in the complete sense in which monetary demand is incorporated 
into market outcomes. Still, Ramsay-Steele argues against Mises, on the grounds that 
the choice between oil and wine could not be made by the socialist planners without 
their having knowledge of production costs. As he points out, Mises is allowing for 
the possibility of choices being made ‘in natura’xv. In so far as such non-algorithmic 
judgements are part of rational decision-making, they count as evidence against Mises 
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holding a purely algorithmic conception of rationality. 
 
The second example given by Mises is that of the one-man economy of Robinson 
Crusoe. The simplicity of this economy means that not only is Crusoe able to choose 
between final goods but he is also able to “form judgements of the significance to him 
of goods of a higher order” without numerical calculation (Mises 1935, 96). This 
requires Crusoe to consider the “intersubstitutability” of these higher order goods. 
Their usefulness must be assessed in relation to the subjective value of “lower order” 
goods that Crusoe is aiming to produce for his own consumption. This is a potentially 
complex task and it is significant that Mises allows for the possibility of it being 
performed through ‘in natura’ calculation, even in a simple economy.  
 
The ‘wine or oil’ and Crusoe examples indicate the possibility of the two different 
aspects of productive calculation being possible in simple cases without monetary 
calculation. The implication is that, for Mises, it is when cases become more complex 
that the difficulty arises for socialist calculation.xvi Mises’ 1920 article highlights 
complexity as the source of the calculation problem. In Socialism Mises further 
describes the situation in which socialist planners would find themselves in the 
absence of factor markets: 
 
“This is not to say that the socialist community would be entirely at a loss. It would 
decide for or against the proposed undertaking and issue an edict. But, at best, such a 
decision would be based on vague valuations. It could not be based on exact 
calculations of value” (Mises 1936, 122). 
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This allowance for the possibility of “vague valuations” again suggests that the 
question of the feasibility of rational ‘in natura’ decision-making is a matter of degree. 
It depends upon the level of complexity in a productive decision and the cognitive 
ability of the decision maker, although Mises makes clear that even the most 
intelligent humans could not make rational productive decisions ‘in natura’ in any but 
the simplest economies.  
 
Cockshott and Cottrell agree that complexity is the source of the need for monetary 
calculation: 
  
“The limits of such planning in kind are set by the degree of complexity of the 
production processes. At some point, it becomes impossible to achieve a synoptic 
appreciation of the relevant interconnections; beyond this point, rationality in the 
allocation of resources requires the use of some objective ‘unit’ in which costs and 
benefits may be expressed” (Cockshott and Cottrell 1993, 78). 
 
7. Hayek on calculation and rationality 
 
One implication of Mises’ acknowledgement of non-economic goods is that it calls 
into question whether the epistemological assumptions of Mises and Hayek were 
really “in conflict,” as O’Neill suggests (O’Neill 2003, 189). This supposed difference 
between Mises and Hayek does not account for Mises’ acknowledgement of 
qualitatively different values that are incommensurable and non-measurable. The 
reason O’Neill draws such a distinction between Mises and Hayek is his interpretation 
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of Mises’ argument on the need for commensurability as implying an algorithmic 
conception of practical rationality: 
 
“Mises’ criticisms of socialism turn primarily on assumptions about 
commensurability that Lange and Taylor shared, but which Neurath and Hayek 
rejected” (O’Neill 2003, 189). 
 
It is true that Hayek rejected the idea that commensurable units of measurement are 
sufficient for achieving rational calculation but as we have seen, so did Mises. So in 
what other sense did Mises make assumptions about commensurability that Hayek 
rejected? Hayek does refer far less frequently than Mises to the need for a 
commensurable unit of measurement. This fact underlies O’Neill’s comment that, “In 
Hayek’s work, the issue of calculation is largely absent” (O’Neill 2003, 189). Yet, as 
Horwitz points out, “one way of reading the shift in emphasis is that Hayek simply 
took for granted that Mises’s original claim in the 1920 article was correct and clear, 
so that Hayek no longer needed to make the point” (Horwitz 1998, 443). But Hayek 
fully agrees with what he refers to as Mises’ “demonstration” that factor prices are 
necessary for ensuring the “economic use of resources” (Hayek 1949b, 143). Hayek 
says of Mises’ thesis that it “represents the starting-point from which all the 
discussions of the economic problem of socialism… must necessarily proceed” (ibid, 
143).xvii This agreement is implicit in much of Hayek’s discussion of the need for 
markets and he does make it explicit in places. He criticises the Lange-model for not 
incorporating a factor market that would be sufficiently free from centralised control 
(ibid, 133-4) and endorses Mises’ case for a “competitive market” as necessary for the 
pricing of factors (ibid, 143).  
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Hayek frequently emphasises the importance of the complexity problem that 
concerned Mises. He explains that the beauty of prices is that they can serve as a 
guide for purchasers of goods, without them needing to know of the events that give 
rise to them (Hayek 1949a, 84; 1982b, 117). This point applies to the purchasers of 
both final goods and factors of production. Hayek agrees with Mises that this 
complexity is the source of the need for factor prices as a commensurable unit of 
measurement. Also like Mises, he refers to two aspects of this complexity. The first is 
the huge variety of productive processes. Producers need to know “which of the 
available technical methods is the most economical in the given circumstances, and 
the changes in the relative scarcities in the different materials” (Hayek 1982b, 117) 
This entails a need for prices: “What he will need in order to choose successfully from 
among the opportunities known to him are signals in the form of known prices he can 
get for the alternative services or goods he can produce” (Hayek 1982b, 9). The 
second source of complexity is that factor prices are influenced by consumers’ 
valuations of final goods. Hayek explains that it is necessary to attach “to each kind of 
scarce resource a numerical index which cannot be derived from any property 
possessed by that particular thing, but which reflects, or in which is condensed, its 
significance in view of the whole means-end structure” (Hayek 1949a, 85). In this 
sense, if monetary calculation is, for Mises, a necessary component of practically 
rational productive decision-making, then the same can be said of Hayek. Like Mises, 
Hayek also emphasises the importance and inevitability of economic change (e.g. 
Hayek 1949a, 82; 1949c 101; 1949d 173) in his presentation of the problem of 
complexity. 
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The importance of prices as a commensurable unit is implicit in Hayek’s account of 
the function of factor markets. He refers to the need to equalise the marginal rates of 
substitution for all factors, which can only be achieved “by all producers adjusting the 
relative quantities of the different factors which they use according to their uniform 
market prices” (Hayek 1982a, 118-9). Hayek was sceptical about whether this 
equilibrium can be reached but this is not to diminish the importance of the process of 
striving to reach it. Mises, after all, shared this scepticism concerning the neoclassical 
concept of equilibrium (Mises 1949, 707). 
 
Hayek’s agreement with Mises on the need for factor prices supports Lavoie’s view 
that Mises and Hayek offer the same calculation argument (Lavoie 1985, 50).xviii 
However, it is true that, as O’Neill points out, Hayek places greater emphasis upon 
the epistemic difficulties that would face any non-market form of economic 
calculation. He stresses that the economic problem of society is a problem of how 
knowledge is to be made available and used (Hayek 1949a, 78; Hayek 1949c, 95). 
Such knowledge, in the Hayekian account, is both dispersed and continually changing 
(O’Neill, 1998 129; Shapiro 1989, 141). Furthermore, much of it is ‘tacit,’ meaning 
that it cannot be “articulated in propositional form” (O’Neill 1998, 130) and is thus 
“linguistically inaccessible” (Horwitz 1996, 73). Hence the “central problem” of 
planning is “our incapacity to assemble as a surveyable whole all the data which enter 
into the social order” (Hayek 1982b). The decentralised process of market exchange 
enables such dispersed, often tacit, knowledge to be utilised by those who possess it 
(Hayek 1949a, 84). The impossibility of a single planning board being able to address 
the complex, economy-wide problem of economic calculation fits with Hayek’s more 
general thesis in Law, Legislation and Liberty that some social scientists fail to 
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recognise the limitations to human reason. Such scepticism seems to O’Neill to 
distinguish Hayek from Mises. 
 
While Mises does not refer to the problem of how tacit knowledge might be 
articulated in a non-market society, he does, as we have seen, point to the scale and 
complexity of the data that exist in an economy, as well as to the limitations of human 
reason in relation to this complexity. Hayek also points to these limitations. Reason 
involves abstracting, or “singling out” only some aspects of the complex situations 
that we experience before making a decision (Hayek 1982a, 30). Contrary to some 
rationalists’ presentation of rationality as a perfectly logical process, “it is always only 
in combination with particular, non-rational impulses that reason can determine what 
to do, and its function is essentially to act as a restraint on emotion or to steer action 
impelled by other factors” (Hayek 1982a, 32). Even though Hayek’s account of 
rationality is not strictly an instrumentalist one, reason is still an influence in the 
selection of means for achieving our desired ends. Hayek does not question the 
rationality of the choices made by producers “endeavouring to produce their outputs 
as cheaply as possible” (Hayek 1982b, 118). There is no reason to doubt that he views 
the cost-based decisions by individual producers as rational when he states: “The 
continuous flow of goods and services is maintained by constant deliberative 
adjustments” (Hayek 1949a, 83). Horwitz agrees that Hayek attaches importance to 
the role of human reason in productive decisions: 
 
“If Hayek were completely dismissing the possibility of rational action by individuals, 
how does one make sense of his repeated claim that spontaneous orders are comprised 
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of the multitude of consciously calculating individuals and organizations we know as 
families and firms” (Horwitz 1998, 441). 
 
Like the Misean argument concerning entrepreneurshipxix (which is not so prominent 
in Hayek’s work), Hayek’s  discussion of knowledge  gives further support to the 
view that only the process of market exchange can make available the commensurable 
unit of measurement that is necessary for economic calculation. As Lavoie argues, 
Hayek’s contribution is best seen as an expansion of the Misean argument rather than 
a refutation of it (Lavoie 1985, 145). Mises and Hayek may differ, especially in terms 
of emphasis, in the reasons that they give for why a commensurable unit can only be 
available in a market system. But both do agree that it is necessary and in this sense 
they do not differ on the issue of commensurability. 
 
What do Mises and Hayek think would be the result of a society in which there was 
no market-based productive calculation? They both expect that the result would be a 
drop in the standards of living.xx For Ramsay-Steele, Mises’ tone generally suggests 
that: “when an attempt is made to implement world-wide socialism, the collapse will 
be so great that the prerequisites of large-scale society will be unsustainable and 
society will fragment into unco-ordinated bands (Ramsay-Steele 1992, 121). The 
emphasis of Hayek, however, is upon the threat to democracy posed by the 
bureaucratic burden of non-market economic calculation. Whichever of these two 
implications are drawn from it, the calculation argument is one that demands a 
response from advocates of democratic, non-market socialism. It is to the adequacy of 
the response of one such advocate, Otto Neurath, that we now turn.  
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8. Neurath’s response 
 
The challenges posed to socialists such as Neurath by both Mises and Hayek are 
founded upon this argument concerning the complexity of productive calculation. 
From this starting point, they each develop their respective arguments concerning 
entrepreneurship, epistemology and democracy. A socialist response therefore needs 
to directly confront the calculation argument. In his 1920 paper, Mises says of 
Neurath,  that he “overlooks the insuperable difficulties that would have to develop 
with economic calculation in the socialist commonwealth” (Mises 1935, 108n). So 
how satisfactory is Neurath’s response?   
 
For Neurath, socialism would not employ a general unit of calculation (Neurath 1935, 
103). Instead, Neurath proposes that a “register” of “life conditions” be developed by 
means of ‘calculation in kind.’ Life conditions include all aspects of the standard of 
living, from food, housing and other material goods to leisure pursuits and 
environmental quality. Measurement ‘in kind’ of such a heterogeneous concept 
requires a variety of units of measurement, including physical quantities, time units 
and other statistical indicators. Neurath does not seek to show that such calculation in 
kind can achieve commensurability between productive alternatives. Indeed, he 
explicitly rejects this possibility (Neurath 1935, 103). The focus of his argument, as 
shall be shown below, is to question the assumption that money as a general unit of 
calculation can serve as a basis for rational decision-making.  
 
Neurath’s discussion of economic efficiency does share some common, if 
uncontentious, ground with Mises and Hayek. He remarks that the efficiency of a 
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factory depends not just on the production techniques it employs but on the usefulness 
of the product it produces (Neurath 1925a, 426). On the problem of factor allocation, 
Neurath does recognise that “it can make sense to find out the importance of 
alterations in these components” (Neurath 1917, 336). But, for Neurath, whether a 
certain productive activity is ‘economical’ is something that “cannot be arrived by 
calculation” (Neurath 1925b, 471) because the ends of economic activity, i.e. 
improvement in life conditions, cannot be subject to a general measure. Neither does 
he consider there to be any general measure of economic factors to be available in the 
absence of a market economy. He dismisses the “theory of economic factors” (by 
which he refers to the Austrian theory of factor imputation) as “based on the 
assumption that increases in the quality of life which are connected with some part of 
the condition of life, could be proportionally attributed to the contributing causes in a 
general way” (Neurath 1917, 335-6).  
 
Neurath’s view that, like cost accounting, factor imputation is “a derivative of money 
calculation” (Neurath 1917, 335) and will not exist in socialism might be taken as 
conceding to Mises that there could be no economic calculation in socialism (Uebel 
2004, 50-1). Where Neurath does confront the Misean argument is in his rejection of 
the rationality of monetary calculation. This is partly through his recognition of the 
existence of non-monetary, incommensurable values and in this respect, as we have 
seen, there is no disagreement with Mises. It was in his emphasis upon the 
implications of this philosophical position for the pro-market case that Neurath’s 
extensive comments expose a weakness in both Mises and Hayek. 
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Once the incommensurability of values is admitted, some important questions about 
the pro-market position arise. The first question is: how wide is the range of goods for 
which monetary valuation is inappropriate? Neurath points to several examples of 
what welfare economists refer to as ‘externalities’. They are both positive and 
negative in nature and include public goods such as health, security (Neurath 1925a, 
446), parks (Neurath 1937, 518), leisure, education and negative effects such as stress 
(Neurath 1919, 373), accidents (Neurath 1935, 79), waste and planned obsolescence 
(Neurath 1920, 379). Neurath also emphasises the importance of ecological criteria, 
showing awareness of the need to conserve natural resources for future generations 
(Neurath 1937, 518). Whilst Mises does point to the scarcity of natural resources in 
response to those socialists who assume abundance (Mises 1936 113; Mises 
1949,236-7) he offers no comment on the potential scale of the problem of 
externalities. Neurath, by contrast, discusses how various public goods and negative 
externalitiesxxi all contribute to the ‘quality of life,’ a concept that he argues is not 
quantifiable though can be gauged approximately in terms of ‘conditions of life’ such 
as units of physical goods, time devoted to work and leisure and various other 
indicators, some of which remain to be formulated (Neurath 1920-1, 356). Neurath 
comments that “no proper place” has been found in economics for this problem of 
measuring the standard of living (Neurath 1937, 519). Another dimension of social 
welfare considered by Neurath is the distribution of goods, which should be “not only 
an effect, but also a goal of human action” (Neurath 1925a, 414). For Mises, by 
contrast, evaluative judgements concerning the distribution of wealth are beyond the 
scope of economics. He therefore does not address the scale of the problem of 
inequality in a market system.  
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Secondly, given that non-monetary criteria make decisions inevitably ethical, political 
and often indeterminate (Uebel 2004, 12) are they not themselves a source of the 
complexity that both market and non-market systems face? Thirdly, what kind of 
institutions will be required in order to ensure that non-monetary values are 
incorporated into economic decision-making and how can they be developed? The 
Marxian argument put by Neurath that profit is the driving force of production in 
capitalist economies (Cartwright 1996, 29) causes a problem for attempts to 
demonstrate that such institutions can be developed satisfactorily within a market 
context. Indeed, the profit motive might itself be viewed as a source of complexity in 
creating incentives that can conflict with addressing problems such as externalities.  
 
Neurath thus recognises that, given the incommensurability of values, the choice 
between a market and non-market society itself involves multiple criteria. There is a 
need for a “comparative economic theory” (Neurath 1935, 68) in which the problem 
of economic calculation, as defined by Mises, is just one of numerous considerations 
that must be incorporated into an approach that weighs both sides of the argument. A 
comparative approach is evident in the work of some socialists such as Oskar Lange 
and Maurice Dobb. They point to certain key advantages of socialism, including the 
capacity to take into account externalities (Lange 1937b, 125; Dobb 1969, 150), 
establish more equal levels of income distribution (Lange 1937b, 123-5; Dobb 1969, 
125), as well as to avoid problems of monopoly (Lange 1937b, 132; Dobb 1969, 151) 
and instability (Lange 1937b, 126; Dobb 1960; Dobb 1969). Lange acknowledges that 
in socialism there would be imperfections in the non-market allocation of investment 
resources but adds: “it seems that this deficiency may be regarded as overbalanced by 
the advantages enumerated” (Lange 1937b, 127).  
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Contemporary commentaries on the Misean contribution to the calculation debate do 
not acknowledge the need for this comparative approach.xxii Interestingly, this need is 
implicit in the concept of catallacticxxiii efficiency to be found in Mises and Hayek 
(Cordato 1994, 132). Their strictly subjectivist ethics means that the key question for 
defining such efficiency is: “what is the institutional setting that will maximise the 
extent to which the individual members of the catallaxy will be able achieve their 
several goals? (ibid, 132).” Thus Mises and Hayek’s work, in highlighting the need 
for a comparative approach, itself demands a broad assessment of the relative merits 
of market and non-market systems.  
 
Hence, Mises’ neglects important questions that follow from his recognition of non-
monetary values. These are questions concerning how non-monetary values can be 
accommodated in any economy, ranging from market to non-market. Neurath’s 
discussion of these issues is an important strength of his contribution.   
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The core of Mises and Hayeks’ case against socialism is that monetary prices, as a 
commensurable unit of measurement, are an indispensable tool for rational economic 
calculation in the face of complexity. This is not to underplay the importance of 
further aspects of the Austrian case for the market, such as those relating to 
entrepreneurship, innovation and information discovery. It is rather to point out that, 
on the Austrian view, numerical factor values are indispensable as a guide to the 
efforts of market participants in the fulfilment of these latter functions. If socialists are 
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to show how productive calculation can be achieved in the absence of market 
exchange, it follows that the problem of achieving commensurability needs to be 
confronted directly as a necessary part of the case for non-market production. This of 
course should be as a complement to and not to the exclusion of addressing the related 
issues of incentives, knowledge discovery and democracy that feature in the case for 
markets.  
 
Otto Neurath, whose discussion of economic decision-making in socialism was 
considerably more extensive than most before him, did not provide an adequate 
response to the problem of factor valuation. More recent proposals, such as those 
proposed by Devine (1988) and Albert and Hahnel (2003), both of which, unlike 
Neurath, do allow for monetary factor pricing, suggest that these prices could be 
established through a democratic, participatory process involving co-ordination by 
committees across various geographical scales and industries, representing both 
consumer and producer interests. Yet, their outlined political frameworks, while 
valuable in many respects,  are not supplemented by specific models for quantitative 
calculation to aid to such pricing decisions. Until this area for future research has been 
further explored, these proposals for participatory planning remain, as Hodgson 
suggests, vulnerable to the Hayekian argument that they place too great a burden upon 
the democratic institutions they envisage (Hodgson 1998, 415).  
 
Still, it has been shown here that, for both Mises and Hayek, the two most significant 
founders of the modern case for markets, the need for productive calculation to be 
based upon market exchange rests upon it reducing the degree of complexity rather 
than ensuring determinate solutions through entirely algorithmic means. This has 
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important implications for the future of the calculation debate. It leaves open the 
possibility of exploring how certain non-market forms of measurement might be used 
to achieve the required degree of commensurability. Various techniques have been 
proposed for calculating ‘shadow prices’ for factors of production under socialism in 
response to the calculation argument.xxiv Two other interesting avenues for further 
research are calculations in terms of labour time and energy. Cockshott and Cottrell 
highlight the possibility of economy-wide labour time calculation that is made 
possible by developments in information technology.xxv They acknowledge that 
labour-based calculation cannot entirely determine every decision and suggest that 
natural resource management should be treated as a separate criterion in decision-
making. Another approach developed by some ecological economists is to measure 
the cost of economic processes in terms of energy units (e.g. Patterson 1998). There is 
the possibility of more than one technique being combined. Such an approach might 
be taken to be consistent with Neurath’s proposals for ‘calculation in kind.’ However, 
Neurath’s references to a multiplicity of measurement units and his dismissal of the 
problem of factor valuation do not amount to a sufficiently serious attempt to address 
the need for achieving a certain degree of commensurability between options.  
 
The recognition of non-monetary values by both Mises and Hayek also points to the 
need to take a broader view of the debate about socialism versus the market. A 
comparative approach is needed that evaluates both sides of the argument and puts the 
economic calculation argument in context. This is a task that needs to be addressed, 
even if it goes beyond the scope of economics in the Misean sense of establishing the 
best means for achieving given ends.  
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Future research must therefore draw two lessons from the early calculation debate 
between Mises and Neurath. Firstly, there is a need to further explore whether the 
required degree of commensurability can be achieved through non-market techniques. 
Secondly, a broader, comparative approach, considering the problems of the market 
highlighted by its critics, is also needed to set the commensurability question in 
context. It is, after all, possible that any loss of Misean productive efficiency resulting 
from the non-market model will be judged to be a price worth paying. 
                                                 
i A little known, early version of the argument had been offered by Pierson in 1902 and versions by 
Weber and Brutzkus were published contemporaneously to Mises. Yet Mises’ paper is generally agreed 
to be the most comprehensive statement of the ‘economic calculation argument’ against socialism 
(Lavoie 1985, 2n) 
ii See, for example, Vaughn (1980), Murrell (1983), Lavoie (1985), Ramsay-Steele (1992). 
iii Mises understands the phrase ‘factors of production’ to include labour (see for example Mises 1922, 
59), although it is not a phrase that he uses frequently. He uses the term ‘higher goods’ or ‘goods of a 
higher order’ to refer to material factors of production. 
iv Max Weber, had, approximately simultaneously, developed this same argument in 1921 (Hayek 
1949b, 143). Weber argued that non-monetary calculation (or ‘calculation in kind’) was inadequate for 
evaluating productive activity where the possible productive means or final products of that process are 
qualitatively different. He pointed to the need for enterprises to be aware of inefficient usage and to 
monitor the value of their stocks, concluding that for calculation in kind “there are formidable 
problems involved here which are incapable of objective solution” (Weber 1968, 102).  
 
v Recent commentators agree that Mises allows for the logical validity of the mathematical definition of 
equilibrium pricing in socialism, as formulated by Barone in 1908 (Barone 1935). It is, for Mises, 
economic change that makes socialist calculation impossible (Lavoie 1985, 56; Murrell 1983, 100).  
vi This interpretation of Mises is also offered in O’Neill (1998). 
vii This can include the revenue accruing from both direct use (e.g. a toll paid by visitors to see the 
waterfall) and indirect use (e.g. hotel revenue generated by the presence of the waterfall nearby). 
viii Note that, in contrast to Mises, Pierce et al hold that it is possible to assign monetary values to OV 
and EV. 
ix A survey of such critiques is provided in Common et al (1993). 
x Further discussion of Neurath’s interpretation of Mises is provided in O’Neill (1995). 
xi In Human Action, Mises hints at a similar point: “Man produces by dint of his reason; he chooses 
ends and employs means for their attainment” (Mises 1949, 142). 
 
xii Mises expresses strong scepticism about the possibility of achieving a clear-cut distinction between 
‘economic’ in this narrow sense and ‘non-economic’ goods (Mises 1936, 125; Mises 1960, 157-8). 
xiii Neurath’s concept of “quality of life” incorporates notions of pleasure and prosperity, as well as an 
Epicurean notion of community prosperity (Cartwright et al 1996, 30; Neurath 1925a, 414-8). 
xiv O’Neill writes “rational economic decision making, beyond the most simple individual decisions, 
requires a single measure on the basis of which the worth of alternative states of affairs could be 
calculated and compared” (my emphasis, O’Neill 1998, 114). 
xv Ramsay-Steele does note that Mises’ imagined choice between 1000 hectolitres of wine and 500 of 
oil might presume that the socialist planners did know production costs (Ramsay-Steele 1992, 118). 
But this reading, as Ramsay-Steele observes, is inconsistent with the passage from Socialism cited 
above (Mises 1936, 141). 
xvi Lavoie makes this point: “the complexity of the decision being made, sharply distinguishes Crusoe’s 
problem from that which would be before the central planning board” (Lavoie 1985, 61). 
xvii Lavoie (1985, 151) refers to this passage from Mises. 
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xviii Lavoie’s conclusion here also follows from his refutation of the suggestion that Mises’ rejected the 
‘logical possibility’ in a stronger sense than did Hayek. 
xix Accounts of Mises’ view on the importance of entrepreneurship are given in Vaughn (1980) and 
Lavoie (1985). 
xx For Mises, attempts at socialism would result in a society in which the provision of consumption 
goods is “diminished” (Mises 1920, 130). Hayek suggests that there would be a “decline in the general 
wealth” (Hayek 1949b, cited in Lavoie 1985, 154). 
xxi The latter is a concept used by Roemer (Roemer 1994, 57). 
xxii This includes the contributions of Vaughn (1980), Murrell (1983), Lavoie (1985), Ramsay-Steele 
(1992) and Kirzner (2001). 
xxiii Catallactics is defined as the “science of exchanges” (Rowley 1994, 289).  
xxiv For example, in his 1933 paper, ‘Price Formation in a Socialist Community’, Dickinson envisages 
the Supreme Economic Council (S.E.C.) using mathematical techniques to set prices both for factors of 
production and consumer goods. These calculations are based upon data that are gathered about the 
demand function for consumer goods, as well as technical data about production functions and the 
supply of resources. Dickinson had been influenced by Enrico Barone’s mathematical solution for 
determining prices under socialism, as set out in his 1908 paper ‘The Ministry of Production in the 
Collectivist State’. Barone offered a mathematical demonstration that it is possible, in principle, for a 
socialist ministry of production to establish a set of ‘prices’ (or “equivalences” as he refers to them) 
that are analogous to the Walrasian market equilibrium (Schumpeter 1954, 987). Barone himself was 
sceptical about the feasibility of implementing such a model and Dickinson later assigns to it a less 
central role in his outline of a socialist economy (Dickinson 1939). A different approach to the problem 
of establishing ‘shadow prices’ is taken by the Soviet mathematician Leonid Kantorovich whose model 
of productive calculation (less ambitiously than the Barone model) assumes the final set of output 
goods as given. He infers shadow prices (or “objectively determined valuations”) for factors of 
production from the optimal production plan for meeting final demand, with the supply of factors taken 
as given (see Kantorovich (1965) for an accessible explanation of this approach). 
xxv Hodgson, a pro-market participant in the debate, acknowledges that Cockshott and Cottrell may 
have an answer to the problem of economic calculation, once it is granted that the required information 
is available to the planners. Hodgson, drawing from the Hayekian epistemological objection to 
markets, argues that this is an assumption that cannot be made. However, this Hayekian argument is 
one to which O’Neill (2003) makes a valuable response. 
